국제투기자본과 전두환: 전두환은 CIA 한국 지부장을 지낸 로버트 브루스터의 오랜 친구로 브루스터와의 인맥 때문에 미국의 재가 하에 쿠데타를 일으킬 수 있었다; 신군부는 브루스터에게 공로 훈장을 수여했다; 1980년 광주사태 때 주한미군 총책임자 존 위컴은 전두환에게 전시 작전통제권 (OPCON)을 위임했으며, 육군 제20보병사단을 허용했다; 리처드 홀부르크 미국무부 아시아태평양 차관보도 전두환에게 광주사태에 대한 미군의 지원을 약속했다
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Katsiaficas
George Katsiaficas is a Greek-American[1] historian and social theorist. He is known for his many writings on social movements, including The Imagination of the New Left: The Global Analysis of 1968[2] and The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life.[3] [4] He was a professor of humanities and sociology at the Wentworth Institute of Technology in Boston from 1985 up to his retirement in 2015.[5][6][7] He sits on the Editorial Board of New Political Science, published by the Caucus for a New Political Science.[8]
Eros effect
After being mentored by Herbert Marcuse, Katsiaficas created the concept of the "eros effect," an analytical tool for explaining mass political awakenings and spontaneous rebellions which sweep through the world in certain time periods. According to this theory, economics and technology alone cannot account for the spread of these movements. Instead it posits that humanist instincts for liberty and justice are triggered by persistent inequality, and explode virally across populations.
Katsiaficas writes that "in moments of eros effect, universal interests become generalized at the same time as the dominant values of society are negated (such as national chauvinism, hierarchy, and individualism)." Other scholars of the theory note that "rebellions in both industrial and preindustrial nations exhibit shared interests in antiauthoritarian self-governance, international solidarity, the transformation of everyday life, and the creation and promotion of alternative values and ethics." Katsiaficas and others have applied this framework to the anti-globalization movement, the "people power" uprisings in Asia in the 1980s (especially the Gwangju Uprising), and the Arab Spring, among other events.[9]
https://blog.pmpress.org/2019/08/23/suit-against-the-cia-re-us-involvement-in-the-1979-assassination-of-south-korean-president-park-chung-hee/
Suit against the CIA re US Involvement in the 1979 Assassination of South Korean President Park Chung-hee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
MASSACHUSETTS – BOSTON DIVISION
GEORGE KATSIAFICAS
Plaintiff
vs.
U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Defendant
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I. Preliminary Statement
1. This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (“FOIA”), seeking an Order for the disclosure and release of agency records improperly withheld from Plaintiff, George Katsiaficas by Defendant U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), injunctive relief, and other appropriate relief.
2. In March of 2010 the Plaintiff, Dr. Katsiaficas, submitted two FOIA requests to the CIA for information concerning, in one case, all documents related to the assassination of the Republic of Korea (“ROK” also known as South Korea) President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 and about his assassin (Korean Central Intelligence Agency (“KCIA”) chairman Kim Jae-kyu), to US persons’ meeting with both individuals, and to any other materials referring to President Park’s assassination. In the second letter the Plaintiff requested access to and copies of records related, describing, and/or concerning the coup d’etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power, including all agency communications in this matter with US Army officer James Hausman and all US government documents related to Park Chung-hee’s meetings with US government personnel, and any materials referring to the May 16, 1961 coup d’etat.
3. FOIA requires a response from the agency receiving the request within 20 days. Although three (3) years have passed since the Plaintiff filed the FOIA request, the CIA has not produced the requested information.
4. The CIA sent a Final Response to Dr. Katsiaficas’s requests in March of 2010, over one year later, on March 29, 2011. The Final Response consisted of twenty-nine (29) pages of various bulletins, summaries & weekly reviews from 1961. This Final Response contained no CIA documents at all.
5. Dr. Katsiaficas, through counsel on May 9, 2011 appealed the March 29, 2011
Final Response, stating it was unresponsive and insufficient in that it did not include any reports or documents that were actually generated by the CIA, concerning the events subject to the FOIA request. Specifically excluded was:
Any response to the request for all agency communications between US Army officer James Hausman and General Park; any response at all to the request concerning the 1979 assassination of General Park.
6. The CIA acknowledged the appeal and on July 20, 2012 sent another Final Response consisting of ten (10) pages, including a two page (heavily redacted) report dated 20 May 1980 concerning the situation in South Korea at that time, and three daily reports. All this information could be found in newspapers at that time. This second Final Response continued to evade the substantive requests made by the Plaintiff, in his initial FOIA request.
7. Dr. Katsiaficas is entitled to the record he seeks. The information received by Dr. Katsiaficas is insufficient and unresponsive. The record of interaction between the members of the US and South Korean governments, the military, and the intelligence agencies of both countries, show it to be impossible that the documents provided in either of the CIA’s Final Requests, represent all of the information the CIA has in relation to the substantive matters contained in Dr. Katsiaficas’ FOIA Request.
8. There is no legal basis for Defendants’ refusal to disclose the records sought, nor for their refusal to timely respond to Plaintiffs’ March 2010 Request.
9. The Plaintiff, Dr. Katsiaficas, seeks an injunction requiring the Defendant, CIA, to process Plaintiffs’ March 2010 request and release all records that have been unlawfully withheld. Dr. Katsiaficas also seeks an order enjoining the CIA from assessing fees for the processing of this request. The documents should be delivered within 90 days.
10. Looking at the history of the CIA there is a clear pattern of the CIA working to remove leaders foreign governments that were not implementing policies deemed acceptable to the U.S. For example, the CIA played a significant role in forcibly removing the leaders of Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Brazil in 1964. The South Korean events, which are the subject of Dr. Katsiaficas’s FOIA requests, are consistent with this pattern.
11. The Plaintiff, Dr. Katsiaficas, asserts based on the facts stated below that there has to be much more information obtained and documented by the CIA concerning the requested information based on the agency’s relationship with the ROK and the KCIA.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
12. This action arises under the laws of the United States, including the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended by Public Law no. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Venue is proper in this District under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The Plaintiff resided in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which is in the District of Massachusetts – Boston Division.
III. PARTIES
13. Plaintiff George Katsiaficas is an U.S. citizen. Dr. Katsiaficas is a professor at Wentworth Institute of Technology in Boston, MA.
14. Dr. Katsiaficas has written extensively about Korea, and is researching South Korea during the time Park Chung-hee was President of South Korea. Dr. Katsiaficas’ research and writing has, and will continue to, serve the public interest by addressing the history of South Korea and the relationship between United States and South Korea. As Korea continues to be a ‘hot spot’ it is important that the information Dr. Katsiaficas has requested be released to improve the public’s understanding of South Korea, where the daughter of Park Chung-hee has recently been elected President.
15. Defendant CIA is a department of the Executive Branch of the United States Government. The CIA is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1).
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Historical Background
16. Immediately after World War II, a United States military government (USAMGIK) came into power in southern Korea. Within a year, local opposition to its policies (which many people blamed for widespread hunger, a cholera epidemic, and continuing repression at the hands of former Japanese loyalist police) produced a series of uprisings, which required massive force to quell.
17. In 1948, the ROK was created with support and under the direction of the United States, with Syngman Rhee installed as president.
18. During the early post-World War II period in South Korea a US army officer, Captain James Hausman (“Hausman”), became the US combat coordinator on the ground in South Korea and became one of the chief US military liaisons with the ROK-eventually becoming the self-described “father of the South Korean army.”
19. Rhee’s administration initiated a “scorched earth” policy of repression against opposition to his rule. In 1948 the Rhee dispatched the ROK’s 14th Regiment to put down rebels on Jeju Island. Before they boarded ship, the men of the 14th mutinied and then took control of much of southernmost Korea, beginning with the city of Yeosu.
20. So serious was the situation in 1948 that USAMGIK headquarters sent a letter to Hausman, telling him, “The fledgling ROK government is tottering and Yeosu must be retaken immediately at all cost.”[1] Hausman personally directed ten of the ROK’s fifteen Constabulary regiments (i.e. the fledging ROK’s army) to encircle and retake the insurgent cities one at a time-no matter what the cost to the population.
21. Through superior firepower provided and supervised by Hausman and an elite group of US officers, the ROK prevailed. Their military was comprised, with only one exception, of Korean commanding officers who had served in the Japanese military. Most were graduates of Manchurian Bong-Chun Military Academy, where they were specifically trained to hunt down Korean partisans.[2]
22. United States operatives were aware of the importance of the Japanese trained police and army officers to U.S. rule in South Korea. These police and officers worked with the U.S. to form the core of the ROK’s political infrastructure for decades to come. Park Chung-hee (later to become president of South Korea from 1961 to 1979) was one such former Japanese officer.[3] However, in 1948, President Park sided with the Yeosu rebels, and was captured and sentenced to death.
23. On August 2, 1948, Hausman personally intervened with Syngman Rhee to save the life of future president Park Chung-hee. Park had been an intelligence officer in the Japanese Army and sought to capture or kill Kim Il-Sung. In 1948, although involved in the Yeosu Uprising, he turned on his former comrades. His subordinate officer, Kim Jeong-sok, captured at the same time as Park, was executed.
24. For the next three decades, Hausman remained the most important U.S. military liaison in South Korea.
25. In 1960, a popular movement overthrew Syngman Rhee, and a democratic government was established.
26. On May 16, 1961, General Park Chung-hee led a coup d’état and overthrew the democratic government. The coup began at midnight on May 16, 1961, when the army moved into cities with force. At 3:30 a.m. on May 17, 1961, Prime Minister Chang Myon telephoned U.S. Commanding General Magruder for US troops to put down the coup, but the U.S. refused the government’s request.
27. James Hausman claimed to have had advance knowledge of the coup.[4]
28. Hausman was pleased when Park Chung-hee, his protégé, became military dictator of the ROK in 1961. For his “efficiency” in “planning and execution of the suppression of Yeosu Uprising,” Hausman received the US Legion of Merit citation.
29. Twenty years after the coup, Hausman was honored by US military commander General John Wickham with a “Meritorious Civilian Service Award.” The citation carried the following words: “Through his close personal relationship with President Park, he was able to persuade the military junta to take actions which eased the apprehensions of US officials, and his comprehensive understanding of the background and aspirations of newly emerged military leadership enabled him to convince US officials at a national level that under this leadership, the Republic of Korea would move forward in a manner that would enhance the United States position in Asia.”[5] Remembering that Hausman had personally intervened with Rhee to save Park’s life in 1948, Park was indebted to him in 1961.
30. In June 1978, the CIA compiled a secret report that maintained: “The present government [under Park Chung-hee] is obsessed with acquiring a weapons system with which it can threaten P’yongyang…”[6]
31. Later in October of 1978 U.S. CIA station chief Robert Brewster and U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen met with Kim Jae-kyu.[7] Ambassador Gleysteen, Richard Holbrooke and US cabinet officials raised human rights concerns with KCIA Director Kim Jae-kyu.[8]
32. On September 26, 1979 Ambassador Gleysteen and US CIA station chief Robert Brewster met with Kim Chae Kyu “in the midst of rising tension between Park and his many critics.”[9]
33. On October 4, 1979 Park expelled elected opposition leader Kim Young-sam from the National Assembly. In response the U.S. embassy released a statement that “the United States publicly criticizes Park’s action against Kim Young-sam and recalls the ambassador for consultations.”[10]
34. In mid-October student and labor protests began in Busan and spread to nearby Masan. On October 18, 1979 Martial Law was declared in Busan and tanks were deployed to put down the disturbances. On October 20, 1979 Martial Law was declared in Masan
35. Also on October 18, 1979 Ambassador Gleysteen and US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown came from Washington and met President Park. “Brown cautioned Park about the costs of political repression.” U.S. Military Commander General John A. Wickham, Jr. also attended this meeting.[11]
36. General Wickham dedicated his memoirs to James Hausman, “the architect of the Republic of Korea army,” who after his retirement from the military served as special assistant for policy and development to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces and ROK-US Combined Forces.[12]
37. In late October 1979, General Wickham asked Hausman about the situation. He later wrote that Hausman was “on a first-name basis with virtually all of the senior ROK officers…and he could also be engaged when necessary to convey unvarnished views back to the Korean leaders.”[13]
38. Park ruled until October 26, 1979, when he was assassinated by his own KCIA Director, Kim Jae-kyu (a.k.a. Kim Chae Kyu).
39. On October 27, 1979 General Wickham and Ambassador Gleysteen met in the US embassy. Gleysteen said, “CIA station chief, Bob Brewster, had gathered enough knowledge to conclude that the plot had been hatched by the KCIA director.” According to Wickham, Chun was “a longtime friend of Brewster’s.” [14]
40. Also on October 27, 1979, in a tense meeting, General Chun Doo-hwan took charge of an investigation into Park’s assassination. “He mentioned that his friend, Bob Brewster, the [U.S.] CIA station chief, had told him the United States would be increasing its presence in the region.”[15]
41. In late November 1979, Ambassador Gleysteen received a military intelligence report stating that Kim Chae Kyu alleged during his interrogation that “a former American ambassador” related to him that President Park “had been in power too long.”[16]
42. On December 12, 1979, General Chun Doo-hwan led a military coup. Chun ordered the execution of Kim Jae-kyu after a secret tribunal convicted him, and on May 24, 1980 Kim Jae-kyu executed by hanging.
43. In 1981, Hausman received a medal of recognition for his years of service to the ROK from Chun Doo-hwan. The same year Hausman was honored by General Wickham with a “Meritorious Civilian Service Award.” The citation carried the following words: “Through his close personal relationship with President Park, he was able to persuade the military junta to take actions which eased the apprehensions of US officials, and his comprehensive understanding of the background and aspirations of newly emerged military leadership enabled him to convince US officials at a national level that under this leadership, the Republic of Korea would move forward in a manner that would enhance the United States position in Asia.”[17]
44. There were widespread allegations that the US was involved in the Park assassination. Then U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen spent a considerable part of his memoirs discussing these allegations.[18] Mr. Gleysteen noted that “Many Koreans, and some Americans, suspected U.S. complicity in President Park’s death. The most prevalent view was that U.S. criticism contributed significantly to his demise…in early November, I found Representative Clement Zablocki, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, transfixed by this issue…Despite firm reinforcement from [Cyrus] Vance [then U.S. Secretary of State], our senior intelligence representative, and others, Zablocki said, “I don’t believe it.”[19]
45. In 2011, Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon reported in a South Korean daily newspaper, Hankyoreh, that ” It is worth noting here there is a “widespread rumor in South Korea that the [U.S.] CIA might have orchestrated his [Park’s] assassination on October 26, 1979, in order to stop his nuclear ambitions.”[20]
46. As a product of the widespread belief in U.S. and CIA involvement, several Korean novels depict US encouragement and even organization of the murder, as does one in English, the bestseller by Steve Shagan, The Circle (Bantam Books, 1982).
V. CAUSE OF ACTION
First Cause of Action: violation of the FOIA for Failure to make a reasonable effort
to search for records
Defendants’ failure to make a reasonable effort to search for records responsive to the March of 2010 request violates the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(A), 552(a)(3)(C) and the corresponding agency regulations.
VI. REQUESTED RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this court Order:
1. Defendant CIA to immediately conduct a thorough search for the requested documents;
2. Defendant CIA to process all requested documents as they are found and copy and deliver said records in their entirety to the Plaintiff;
3. Award Plaintiff his costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in this action; and
4. Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
George Katsiaficas, Plaintiff,
by his attorney,
Neil J Berman
Common Sense Legal Counseling
109 College Avenue
Somerville MA 02144
[1] Letter from headquarters to Hausman cited in “My Earliest Memories in Korea,” Harvard University Hausman archive, Yenching Library, Box 9.
[2] Lee Young-il, “The Truth about ‘Yo-Sun Incident’ and ‘Massacre of Civilians,'” in Forum: Civilian Massacre, Program of the 24th May Commemorative Event (Gwangju: May 18th Memorial Foundation, 2004) p. 180.
[3] Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, 1981) p. 264.
[4] Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: Norton, 1997) p. 349.
[5] Harvard University Yenching Institute, Hausman archive, Box 7, p. 3 of the citation.
[6] CIA, “South Korean Nuclear Development and Strategic Decision-making: An Intelligence Assessment,” June 1978 (approved for public release in October 2005).
[7] Gleysteen, p. 36.
[8] Gleysteen, p. 34.
[9] Gleysteen, p. 59.
[10] Gleysteen, p. xvi.
[11] Gleysteen, p. 52; John A. Wickham Jr., Korea on the Brink: A Memoir of Political Intrigue and Military Crisis (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000) p. 5.
[12] Wickham, p. ix.
[13] Wickham, p. 29.
[14] Wickham, p. 34.
[15] Wickham, p. 33.
[16] Gleysteen, p. 58.
[17] Harvard University Yenching Institute, Hausman archive, Box 7, p. 3 of the citation.
[18] See Gleysteen, especially pages 57-62.
[19] Gleysteen, p. 57-58.
[20] Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, “Park Chung Hee, the CIA & the Bomb,” Hankyoreh. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/497897.html
Accessed on October 24, 2011.
정권을 장악한 직후 전두환이 미국측과 만나 모종의 묵계를 체결했다는 의혹 또한 존재한다. 1993년 말 미국이 공개 때 삭제했던 비밀문서 전문 11항에는 "전두환은 '미국이 미국통제하에 있는 정승화를 시켜서 나를 체포하려 함으로서 나를 힘든 입장에 처하게 한 사실을 발견했다'고 경고했다. 또 '미국이 박대통령 시해사건에 연관돼 있으며 김재규의 형량을 낮추려 한다는 소문이 끊임없이 나돌고 있으며 전씨 자신이 이 같은 소문을 진정시키기 위해 힘든 나날을 보내고 있다'고 말했다"는 부분이다.[54]
기밀해제된 미 대사관 문서에 따르면 당시 비상계엄을 주도한 한국 군부세력에 대해서는 "전두환이 중심적(central) 역할을 하는 것으로 짐작된다"고 분석하는 반면, 최규하 대통령에 대해서는 "A helpless president"(무력한 대통령)이라는 표현을 썼던 것이 확인된다. 같은 문서에서 "전두환이 당시 상당히 중요한 리드를 하는 것 같은데 결정적 역할을 한 것 같지는 않다고 봤다"는 대목에 관하여 5.18 진상조사위원회에서는 "한국에 전두환 개인뿐 아니라 전두환을 중심으로 한 집단적인 쿠데타 세력이 존재한다고 판단했던 것" 이라고 설명한다.[64]
또한 삭제된 비밀문서 맨 마지막 12항에는 '브루스터가 동석했다'는 내용이 존재한다. 이날 만남은 글라이스틴 주한미국대사와 로버트 브루스터 CIA 한국지부장, 전두환, 그리고 이름이 밝혀지지 않은 통역자가 배석한 것이다.[54][65]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1981/08/13/robert-george-brewster-54-retired-from-service-at-cia/42b16226-f991-47c0-9707-567769fdab81/
로버트 브루스터
해당 기사는 1981년 8월 13일자 워싱턴포스트 아카이브 기사로
사망 당시 54세로 1926/27년 생으로 추정됩니다.
부고 기사에도 그렇고 중앙일보의 1994년판 청와대 비서실 5공편에도 그렇고
전두환 신군부가 공로 훈장을 수여한 것으로 나옵니다.
//
데이비드 록펠러, 워런 버핏 주목한 워싱턴 포스트
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_H._Gleysteen
Although
the United States generally earned plaudits among South Koreans for its
consistent criticism of political repression in the Park and Chun eras,
Gleysteen said that those positive emotions were “muffled for many
years by emotions and misinformation that mushroomed after the Kwangju
Uprising in the spring of 1980.”[10] In his memoirs, Gleysteen said the Kwangju Uprising took
place in the context of the long-running democratization movement as
well as regional rivalry between the Cholla Province and Park Chung-hee's native Gyeongsang Province.[11] The
proximate cause of the incident was a renewed and extended nationwide
state of martial law declared by Chun, along with the arrest of
democratization leaders, including Cholla native Kim Dae-jung. The
uprising began on May 18 with a protest by approximately 200 students at
the Chonnam National University. A series of violent skirmishes with
the police quickly increased the number of protestors, and by May 20 the
number of protesters had grown to 10,000. On May 21 a group of
students, workers, and other citizens of Kwangju attacked government
buildings, seizing weapons and ammunition.[11] As the rebellion unfolded, Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham (commander of the United Nations Command at
that time) criticized military and political leaders for their handling
of the incident, and on May 21 the South Korean troops were withdrawn
to the edge of the city, beginning a standoff which continued until May
27, when some 6,000 troops entered Kwangju, ending the rebellion.[11] During
the uprising but before the outbreak of serious violence, Gleysteen met
with General Chun to urge restraint with regard to the student
protests, and received multiple assurances that the Korean government
was "very aware of the danger of over reaction and the use of military
force," and that "the president was determined to go to great lengths to
avoid using the army except as an instrument of last resort".[12][13] President
Choi made a speech in June expressing regret for the violent turn of
events, but he did not offer an apology, although Gleysteen said that he
had encouraged him to do so.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_A._Wickham_Jr.
Role in Gwangju Massacre
After Chun Doo-hwan seized control of South Korea in a military coup following the 1979 assassination of South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee, nationwide pro-democracy protests erupted. Appalled by the brutal repression of student protests at Chonnam National University in Gwangju, protests escalated to the level of city-wide uprising.[2] Martial law forces responded by escalating the violence, opening fire on unarmed protesters. On May 20, the same day that special-forces paratroopers shot protesters near Gwangju station, Wickham received a request from the ruling military junta to transfer OPCON for the ROK Army 20th division. After consultation with US ambassador William H. Gleysteen and colleagues in Washington, Wickham approved the OPCON transfer. By 2230 hours on the same evening, elements of the 20th division had already been moved to Gwangju.[3] The next day, the violence escalated, including indiscriminate firing on civilians from helicopters.[4] By May 27, the 20th division, along with four other divisions, had been used to re-take the city in a large-scale military assault leading to numerous civilian deaths and casualties. When asked to testify about the massacre in 1989 for the South Korean National Assembly, Wickham maintained that he had no way not to approve of the OPCON transfer. Many Koreans believe, however, that his response to the notification of OPCON transfer amounted to a tacit approval of the massacre.[5]
위컴은 1996년에 대한민국 육군 제20보병사단의 광주 투입을 승인했다고 시인하여 논란을 초래했다.
전시 작전통제권(戰時作戰統制權, 영어: Wartime Operational Control, WT-OPCON)은 전시에 군대를 총괄적으로 지휘하고 통제할 수 있는 권한을 말한다.
마침내 80년 5월 신군부의 권력 찬탈에 대한 저항으로 광주항쟁이 일어났다. 광주학살의 참상은 아마 국내보다
해외에서 먼저 접하게 되었을 것이다. 내가 외신기자들이 촬영한 생생한 광주학살 필름을 항쟁이 진압된 지 불과 한 주일 정도 지나서
봤으니까 말이다.. 국내로부터도 학살 상황을 증언하는 수많은 기사들이 비밀리에 전달되어 왔다.
나는 몸을 떨었다.
한국군의 작전권을 주한미군 사령관이 가지고 있다는 것은 천하가 다 아는 사실이다. 미국의 승인 없이 어떻게 한국군 부대가 광주에
가서 민간인들을 학살한다는 말인가. 광주학살이야말로 미국이 전두환 일당을 지지하고 있다는 산 증거였다.
나는 국무성 기자회견 때면 으레 대변인을 물고 늘어졌다.
"미국의 이념이 무엇인가? 국익을 위해서라면 자국민을 학살하는 독재자라도 지지하는 것이 미국의 이념인가?"
나는 홀부르크(국무성 아시아. 태평양담당 차관보)에게 따졌다.
"도덕정치와 인권외교를 표방하는 카터 행정부가 어떻게 한국군이 광주학살에 나서는 것을 승인할 수가 있는가?"
홀브르크는 냉담하게 답했다.
"광주 사태를 방치했으면 한국의 안보가 위태로웠을 것이다. 그런 마당에 한국의 인권이 문제냐?"
카터의
이상은 제3세계의 친미정권을 안정시켜야 하는 미국의 국익에 부딪혀 좌절되었다. 이후 미국 의회가 전두환의 정권 찬탈을 이유로
4억 5천만 달러의 차관을 연기하려 할 때 카터는 단연 안보가 인권에 앞선다는 입장을 취했다. 결국 전두환 체제를 승인하고
정착시킨 것은 아이러니컬하게도 도덕주의자 카터였다.
80년 7월 아시안 외무장관 회담이 말레이시아 쿠알라룸프르에서
있었다. 미국에서는 머스키 국무장관이 참석했고, 국무성 기자단이 취재차 수행했다. 회담을 마치고 말레이시아를 떠나기 전날 [워싱턴
포스트]의 오버도퍼 기자가 내게 말했다.
-"쥬리, 나는 도쿄를 거쳐 서울로 들어간다."
"왜?"
-"전두환과 인터뷰하기로 되어 있어."
나는 정말 오버도퍼가 부러웠다. 전두환을 인터뷰하는 것이 부러운 것이 아니라 서울에 간다는 것이 부러웠다. 그 때 서울 언니의 병이 나날이 깊어가고 있었다. 조카들은 매일 미국에 전화해서 성화였다.
"이모, 어머니가 매일 이모만 찾으세요. 박정희도 죽었는데 미국 이모는 왜 안 오나 하고 계세요. 언제쯤 들어오실 수 있으세요?"
난들
마음이 급하지 않을 리 없었다. 그러나 워싱턴의 한국 대사관은 계속 비자 발급을 거부했다. 박정희가 죽고 유신체제가 무너지고
서울의 봄이 왔다는데도 나는 여전히 '반한인사'였다. 광주항쟁이 일어나면서 연일 광주학살 고발 기사를 [한국신보]에 쓰고 있었으니
비자 발급은 더욱 난망했다.
- 문명자
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